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NOTE
LEFT OUT IN THE COLD: FREEZING INNOCENT
SPOUSES’ ASSETS IN SEC ACTIONS
Zoe A. Jones*
Securities fraud not only has a large effect on the innocent victims
of the fraud but also on the innocent spouses and children of culpable
defendants.  In some cases, innocent spouses may have their assets fro-
zen even when such assets are personal and not traceable to the fraud.
This Note suggests potential solutions that would make Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) actions fairer and more efficient without
compromising the enforcement goals of the SEC.
While innocent spouses may have equitable remedies available to
them—requesting a modification of the temporary restraining order
(TRO) or showing that frozen assets are untainted by the fraud—these
remedies may not be enough.  To pursue any of these remedies, the
spouse must have funds to cover attorney’s fees.  This may prove impos-
sible and effectively prevent the spouse from obtaining relief.
The solution suggested in this Note is to narrow the scope of the
TRO granted to the SEC when they bring an action.  While the proceed-
ing could remain ex parte, the court should require that the SEC make a
showing that the assets to be frozen are tainted by the fraud.  Such a
solution is in the interests of both fairness and efficiency.  Furthermore,
courts could include a balancing of the hardships that would occur if the
TRO is granted.  As evidenced by tax fraud provisions, it is possible to
maintain an effective system of recovering funds that have been obtained
illegally without punishing those who are innocent.  Similar concessions
can be made to protect innocent spouses in securities fraud cases.
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INTRODUCTION
In a world where securities fraud enforcement actions are increas-
ingly common,1 it is important to analyze the impact that such actions
have on victims.  There are the obvious victims—those who are de-
frauded—who often end up losing their hard-earned assets and in some
cases their entire life savings.  However, there are also victims who are
indirectly affected—the innocent spouses and families of culpable de-
fendants.  Imagine an innocent spouse losing her home, her assets, and
any funds she may have had to support herself and her children solely
because her husband committed a crime of which she had no knowledge.
Undoubtedly, there must be a way of punishing criminals for their
wrongdoing without forcing their innocent family members to give up
everything they own.
At first glance, it may be easy to assume a defendant’s spouse is
equally culpable, reasoning that the spouse “must” or “should” have
known.  It is even easier to make such an assumption when that spouse
may have been living off of the spoils of a defendant’s reprehensible
actions.  But what about cases where it is uncontested that the spouse is
innocent of wrongdoing and had no knowledge that a fraud was being
perpetrated?  Is it fair to deprive a defendant’s spouse of all untainted
assets when that spouse is just as blindsided as the defrauded investors?
In many cases, once the government brings an action against a fraud
defendant, a court will order a very broad temporary restraining order
(TRO) or injunction, restraining the defendant and those acting in “par-
ticipation” with the defendant from accessing their assets.  Although it
may be uncontested that a spouse is innocent, the spouse will still be
prevented from accessing any joint assets because the spouse is consid-
1 See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Cases Climb for the First Time Since 2011, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 30, 2014, at C1.
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ered to be acting in participation with the defendant.  Furthermore, the
court can name a spouse as a nominal defendant—even when the court
recognizes that spouse as innocent of wrongdoing—and gain access to
the spouse’s personal assets for potential recovery.
It is surely true that a defendant should not be allowed to keep the
spoils of fraudulent, criminal activity.  The thought of allowing a defen-
dant to continue living in the lap of luxury while innocent people suffer
would enrage most anyone.  While in the face of a large-scale securities
fraud it is easy to demand that justice be served, we must stop to ask
ourselves, at what cost?  A defendant may be stripped of liberty and any
profit derived from the fraud, but is it fair to punish innocent people
simply because they had the misfortune of being a family member of that
defendant?  Certainly one could think of no other crime where society
calls for deprivation of an innocent person’s property to provide restitu-
tion to victims.
Depriving an innocent spouse of assets becomes even more illogical
in light of the fact that such assets may be frozen even when they were
not derived from the proceeds of the fraud.  The broad nature of the TRO
includes those assets that may have been acquired before the fraud be-
gan; bought with funds from a legal source (such as lawful employment);
or obtained through an inheritance completely unrelated to the fraud.
Focusing solely on actions brought under federal law by the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), this Note will ana-
lyze the remedies that innocent spouses may have when their assets are
frozen.  There are certain steps that a spouse may take after the TRO is
issued.  If not named as a nominal defendant, the spouse may seek to
intervene in the suit.  Then the spouse may request a modification to the
TRO or request release of funds upon a showing that they are untainted
by the fraud.  In some situations, a spouse may even seek to strike a deal
with the government to retain a certain (limited) amount of assets, or
decide to divorce the defendant.
Finding ways around an asset freeze requires time and, most impor-
tantly, money.  However, inability to access such funds may, in practice,
make remedies nearly impossible to obtain.  Given that the spouse’s as-
sets are inaccessible, the spouse may find it difficult to retain an attorney
to pursue available remedies.  Moreover, the assets may not be released
even when it can be shown that they came from a legal source and were
not a product of the fraud.  As a result, assets may not be available even
when necessary to cover basic living expenses, leaving innocent spouses
without any way to support themselves and their children.
This Note will consider the unfairness of depriving an innocent per-
son of property based on the crimes of their spouse.  Given that untainted
assets are frozen by broad TROs, the simplest solution may be to analyze
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-2\CJP205.txt unknown Seq: 4 19-JAN-15 9:31
384 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24:381
the source of the funds prior to issuing the TRO.  Furthermore, the cur-
rent standard for granting a TRO in SEC actions is much lower than
other standards, and in the interest of fairness, the standard could be
raised by including a balancing of the hardships.
Part I of this Note explains how and why assets are frozen in a
securities fraud case and the remedies that an innocent spouse has to
regain access to frozen funds.  Part II discusses the difficulties a spouse
may have in pursuing different remedies (both equitable and non-equita-
ble) and the fairness concerns in freezing all of a defendant’s assets, in-
cluding those belonging to the defendant’s spouse.2  Part II advocates
that courts should take a lenient approach when deciding whether to un-
freeze assets to cover attorney’s fees.  Additionally, Part II suggests that
a solution to policy and fairness concerns would be the narrowing of the
initial TRO against the defendant to exclude untainted assets and include
a consideration of the balance of the hardships.
I. OVERVIEW OF ASSET FREEZES AND REMEDIES
A. Freezing of Assets in Cases of Fraud
When trying to stop securities fraud, the SEC is very likely to freeze
a defendant’s assets by seeking a TRO or preliminary injunction.3  The
rationale behind this is that the freeze can help ensure that there are as-
sets available to compensate victims of the securities fraud if the defen-
dant is found liable.4  There is nothing requiring all of a defendant’s
assets to be frozen, and logically, all that should be required is that the
court order enough assets to be frozen to ensure that any potential pay-
ments or penalties can be fulfilled.5  Nevertheless, courts are most likely
to initially freeze all of a defendant’s assets,6 even if not all of those
assets are “tainted” by the fraud.7
When granting the freeze, the court not only has the option to pre-
vent defendants from accessing the assets for an indefinite period of
2 This Note will not address the complicated issue of receivership.  There is most cer-
tainly a fairness concern in allowing a receiver to collect a large payment from the defendant’s
frozen assets while refusing to grant assets to an innocent spouse.  This issue, however, is
beyond the scope of this Note.
3 6 ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD
§ 12:74, at 12-217 to 12-218 (2d ed. 2014).
4 See e.g., SEC v. Gen. Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (D.D.C. 1975)
(“[T]he SEC is seeking the freezing of certain specific assets that are clearly related to the
alleged scheme in order to assure a source to satisfy that part of the final judgment which
might be ordered specifically by this Court.”).
5 BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 12-220. R
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., SEC v. Vaskevitch, 657 F. Supp. 312, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (freezing all of a
defendant’s assets and noting that “if at some later stage the freeze appears too broad, it can be
appropriately narrowed”).
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time, but it can also prevent a wide range of others from accessing them.8
These others can include the defendant’s officers, employees, or attor-
neys and any persons considered to be “in active concert or participation
with them.”9  Once served on the defendant and anyone who may hold
his assets,10 the TRO is issued very broadly against third persons.11  Be-
cause spouses often share all assets, especially large ones such as houses
or bank accounts, a broad TRO will be particularly restrictive for them.
Once a TRO is granted, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that
the freeze is excessive or to request that the court modify the TRO.12
These very broad TROs are “almost routinely granted” without any
consideration given to the harmful effects they may cause to a defen-
dant’s family who may rely on the frozen assets.13  Additionally, the bal-
ancing of hardships that is used when considering other injunctions is not
considered when the SEC moves to freeze assets.14
Furthermore, a court may issue a TRO freezing assets of a third
party against whom no wrongdoing is alleged—such as an innocent
spouse—by making that third party a nominal defendant.15  The third
party need only have funds that are a part of the subject of the litiga-
tion—here, funds tainted by the fraud— in order to be named as a nomi-
nal defendant against whom a judgment may be collected.16
The next section of this Note outlines the potential remedies that an
innocent spouse has and whether such remedies are realistic or fair.  This
Note will then suggest certain changes that could be made to the injunc-
tion process so that a balance is struck between the need to ensure that
there are assets available to compensate victims of the defendant’s fraud
and the need to ensure that the family is not left without adequate means
to live.
8 BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 12-218. R
9 See, e.g., Vaskevitch, 657 F. Supp. at 316.
10 BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 12-218. R
11 See id. at 12-219.
12 Id. at 12-220.
13 See id. at 12-224.
14 SEC v. Hede´n, 51 F. Supp. 2d 296, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Unlike a preliminary in-
junction enjoining a violation of the securities laws, which requires the SEC to make a sub-
stantial showing of likelihood of success as to both a current violation and the risk of
repetition, an asset freeze requires a lesser showing.”).  For the SEC to obtain an injunction
freezing a defendant’s assets, it need only show that “it is likely to succeed on the merits.” Id.
(quoting SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  Additionally, “[u]nlike a private litigant, the SEC need not show that there is a risk of
irreparable injury.” Id.
15 See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1991); see also discussion infra Part
I.B (discussing how a spouse becomes a party to such an action).
16 See Cherif, 933 F.2d at 414.
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B. Remedies for the Spouse Once Assets Are Frozen
There are two ways that a spouse may become a party to the SEC
action.  First, the spouse of a defendant can be joined in the suit as a
nominal defendant.17  The SEC may name a spouse as a nominal defen-
dant in order to freeze assets belonging solely to the spouse.18  Although
the court may recognize nominal defendants as innocent of any wrongdo-
ing, they are named as defendants because they have received funds or
property that are traceable to the illegal activity.19  For a spouse to be
named a nominal defendant in a securities enforcement action, the
spouse need only “(1) ha[ve] received ill-gotten funds; and (2) . . . not
have a legitimate claim to those funds.”20  This ultimately allows the
SEC to recover property from the nominal defendant.21
Second, in the event that a spouse is not named as a nominal defen-
dant, the spouse may seek to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 24(a).22  This may be the case when a couple’s joint assets are
frozen under the TRO.  Such deprivation may be particularly acute if the
spouse does not have any assets that are solely her own.23  Under Rule
24(a), an applicant seeking to intervene as of right must demonstrate that:
(1) it has a significant protectable interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action;
(2) the disposition of the action may, as a practical mat-
ter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect its
interest; (3) the application is timely; and (4) the existing
parties may not adequately represent the applicant’s
interest.24
If the spouse is either named as a nominal defendant or intervenes under
Rule 24(a), she can use the equitable remedies discussed below, namely
17 See Camisha L. Simmons, Defrauded Parties’ Recovery of Funds from Innocent Third
Parties: The Relief Defendant, BANKR. LITIG. COMMITTEE (Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexandria, VA),
Aug. 2009, available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/litigation/vol6num5/
defrauded.html; see also Cherif, 933 F.2d at 414 (explaining the use of a nominal defendant in
an SEC action).
18 See, e.g., SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129, 136–37 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding an in-
junction freezing funds in the account of a defendant’s wife that were the proceeds of fraud,
even though she was not accused of any wrongdoing).
19 Simmons, supra note 17. R
20 Cavanagh, 155 F.3d at 136.
21 See Simmons, supra note 17 (citing Cavanaugh, 155 F.3d at 137). R
22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2); see also SEC v. Lefebvre, No. C 02–3704 JSW, 2004
WL 2696731, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2004) (outlining when an applicant may seek to
intervene in an SEC action).
23 It is plausible that a married couple could share all assets, including houses, bank
accounts, etc.  This scenario may be more likely in cases where the spouse is a homemaker,
such as our example spouse, Anne, introduced in Part II.
24 Lefebvre, 2004 WL 2696731, at *2 (quoting United States v. Los Angeles, 288 F.3d
391, 397 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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requesting modification of the order and arguing that certain assets are
untainted.25
1. Requesting Modification of the Order
Just as a court has the authority to issue an order temporarily freez-
ing a defendant’s assets, it also has the authority to release frozen assets
or to modify the amount frozen.26  In many cases, defendants seek a
modification of a TRO to cover attorney’s fees.27  Defendants also seek
to access funds for other expenses.28  Courts, however, may be disin-
clined to grant such modifications when they are faced with a significant
number of defrauded investors.29
When a defendant requests that the court modify an existing TRO,
courts will commonly look to several factors.  These factors include (1)
what is in the best interests of the defrauded investors, (2) the source of
the released funds,30 (3) the balance of the defendant’s interests versus
the government’s interests, and (4) the expenses that the defendant seeks
to pay.31  Some courts hold that the defendant has the burden to show
that “such a modification is in the interest of the defrauded investors.”32
In some situations, releasing funds from a freeze may actually bene-
fit defrauded investors.  This would be the case if the TRO was causing
such a disruption to a defendant’s business that it was at risk of financial
ruin, and therefore lessening the value of the assets available to compen-
sate defrauded investors.33
When deciding whether to modify a TRO to release funds for living
expenses, the court must balance “[t]he defendant’s interest in having
25 Cf. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d at 136–37 (noting that any named defendant, even if named
only as a nominal defendant, has a “full opportunity to litigate her rights”).
26 See, e.g., SEC v. Duclaud Gonzalez de Castilla, 170 F. Supp. 2d 427, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (releasing assets to pay for legal expenses).
27 For examples of cases that sought to release frozen funds to pay for attorney’s fees
(among other things), see Duclaud Gonzalez de Castilla, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 429 and SEC v.
Coates, No. 94 Civ. 5361 (KMW), 1994 WL 455558 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1994).
28 See, e.g., SEC v. Forte, 598 F. Supp. 2d 689, 691 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (discussing defen-
dant’s request for release of frozen assets for a variety of expenses including mortgage pay-
ments, health insurance, and groceries); SEC v. Dobbins, No. Civ.3:04–CV–0605-H, 2004
WL 957715, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (discussing defendant’s request for release of frozen
assets for a variety of expenses including business, living, and accounting expenses).
29 See Dobbins, 2004 WL 957715, at *1, *4 (denying a defendant’s motions where over
fifty investors were allegedly defrauded).
30 See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
31 See, e.g., Forte, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 692–94 (weighing the interests of the defendant
against those of the defrauded investors).
32 SEC v. Grossman, 887 F. Supp. 649, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d sub nom. SEC v.
Estate of Hirshberg, 101 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Coates, 1994 WL 455558, at *3
(declining to modify an asset freeze on investor protection grounds).
33 Forte, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (citing SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d
1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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access to funds needed to pay ordinary and necessary living ex-
penses . . . against the government’s interest in preventing the depletion
of potentially forfeitable assets.”34  The court will look to factors such as
the defendant’s current funds, expenses, and the defendant’s ability to
obtain financial support from friends and family.35  Often, a court will
decline to release assets for living expenses if the defendant does not
provide sufficient and detailed documentation.36  Therefore, it is ex-
tremely important for defendants to include thorough documentation if
they hope for their request to be granted.
Finally, the court will consider the nature of the expenses that the
defendant seeks to pay.  Courts will generally deny requests when the
evidence before them indicates that the defendant is “requesting funds
for luxuries, not necessities.”37  Expenses that may be considered neces-
sities include “those types of bills which would be considered ordinary
such as phone companies, the electric company, life insurance compa-
nies, and doctors.”38  Expenses that courts have considered to be luxuries
include aesthetic expenses, such as hair care or lawn care, and the costs
of upkeep on multiple properties.39  Where a defendant is not seeking the
release of assets to pay for luxuries and has shown, by sufficient docu-
mentation, that he has no other sources of income, some courts may grant
a release of funds to cover necessary living expenses.40
2. Showing of Untainted Property
Once a court grants a broad TRO freezing all of a defendant’s as-
sets, the defendant may argue that “untainted” assets—those that were
not derived from the fraud—should be released from the order.  Courts
34 Dobbins, 2004 WL 957715, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
35 For cases noting a defendant’s lack of documentation to support a request for modifi-
cation of a TRO, see Forte, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 63–94 and Dobbins, 2004 WL 957715, at *3.
36 See Forte, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (denying a defendant’s motion to release funds
because the defendant did not provide an accounting of all assets held by him, his spouse, and
members of his household); Dobbins, 2004 WL 957715, at *3 (denying a defendant’s motion
to release funds because he did not provide information “sufficient for the Court to determine
the legitimacy of the request”).
37 SEC v. Dowdell, 175 F. Supp. 2d 850, 854 (W.D. Va. 2001).
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., Forte, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 694 (denying release of funds to pay for expenses
such as satellite television and high-speed internet); SEC v. Duclaud Gonzalez de Castilla, 170
F. Supp. 2d 427, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (partially denying a defendant’s motion, where defen-
dant requested funds to pay for living expenses including a monthly expense of “$1,800 for a
nanny, housekeeper, handy-man, and nurse”); SEC v. Coates, No. 94 Civ. 5361 (KMW), 1994
WL 455558, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1994) (denying a defendant’s motion for release of
funds to cover mortgages on three properties, hair care, lawn service, and pool service).
40 See, e.g., Dowdell, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 854–55.
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may release frozen assets if it can be shown that they were not the prod-
uct of the defendant’s fraud.41
Upon such a motion by the defendant, a court can—and must in
some cases—order that the TRO may not be continued until an adversary
hearing is held on “whether (1) the SEC has established a prima facie
case of securities law violations, and (2) the SEC has made a showing
that the frozen assets are traceable to fraud.”42  If the defendant prevails
in the adversary hearing, the court may release some or all of the un-
tainted assets from the freeze and make them available to the spouse for
things such as attorney’s fees and living expenses.  When a defendant
requests that a court release untainted funds from a TRO, the defendant
must provide sufficient documentation to allow the court to make a de-
termination that the frozen assets contain such untainted funds.43
The release of untainted funds, however, is not a certainty.  Some
courts may hold that where “it appears likely that investor losses dwarf
[the] [d]efendant’s remaining assets,” no funds should be released.44  The
rationale for this is that where a defendant may be held jointly and sever-
ally liable for a judgment, “[i]t is irrelevant whether the funds affected by
the Assets Freeze are traceable to the illegal activity,” because those
funds would go towards compensating victims regardless of if they were
untainted by the fraud.45  Thus, a court may even use this rationale to
uphold a freeze on the assets of a nominal defendant that are not tracea-
ble to illegal activity.46  In practice, this means that a court can uphold a
TRO freezing the assets of a spouse, even where the spouse is recognized
as innocent of any wrongdoing and maintained personal assets separate
from proceeds of the fraud.  If such a TRO may be upheld, there may be
no hope of remedy for some spouses even though they are innocent and
41 See Forte, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 693; cf. SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir.
1998) (upholding an injunction freezing the proceeds from the sale of stock at issue in a fraud
case).
42 Coates, 1994 WL 455558, at *3 (citing United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186,
1203 (2d Cir. 1991)). This standard comes from United States v. Monsanto, in which a crimi-
nal defendant was facing drug and conspiracy charges. See 924 F.2d at 1203.  The Coates
court, however, recognized that many of the reasons for holding a hearing that were cited in
Monsanto were equally applicable in a securities fraud case. Coates, 1994 WL 455558, at *3.
The reasoning from Monsanto, however, applies only where the SEC brings a companion
criminal case.  The complexities that arise from a companion criminal case and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel that are implicated, while briefly addressed, are not the focus of
this Note.
43 See SEC v. Current Fin. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 66, 68 (D.D.C. 1999) (denying a
defendant’s motion to release funds from a freeze because “[n]early all of [defendant]’s sup-
porting documentation is inconclusive, or even detrimental, as to his claim that the frozen
account contains personal funds”).
44 Forte, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
45 SEC v. Grossman, 887 F. Supp. 649, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d sub nom. SEC v.
Estate of Hirshberg, 101 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1996).
46 Id. (upholding a freeze of the personal assets of a defendant’s wife and daughter).
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were responsible enough to acquire and maintain personal assets in their
marriage.
3. Deals with the Government
One alternative that a spouse may have to seeking an equitable rem-
edy is to strike a deal with the government.  In such a deal, a spouse
gives up any possible claim to untainted assets in exchange for a pay-
ment from the seized assets, which the government will not contest.  One
example of a spouse making such a deal is the case of Ruth Madoff.
Ruth Madoff is the wife of the infamous Bernie Madoff,47 the investor
who defrauded his clients out of billions of dollars in what is arguably
the most famous Ponzi scheme in history.48  In March 2009, Bernie
Madoff pled guilty to eleven criminal charges filed against him by the
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.49
In June 2009, he was sentenced to a 150-year prison term and entered
into a forfeiture agreement.50  Ruth Madoff’s situation differs from the
situation described throughout this Note, however, because her inno-
cence was not legally conceded.51  Although it is unclear whether Ruth
Madoff was involved in her husband’s business dealings, she maintained
that she “did not know of or participate in her husband’s wrongdoing.”52
In June 2009, Ruth Madoff entered into a settlement with the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York.53  In this settle-
ment, Ruth Madoff agreed to give up any claim she had to $80 million
worth of assets that she stated were untainted.54  In exchange, the U.S.
Attorney’s office agreed not to contest Ruth Madoff’s claim to $2.5 mil-
lion worth of assets that had been seized.55
Striking a deal with the prosecution is an appealing option because
it can prevent a spouse from going through an extensive (and expensive)
legal battle in order to obtain frozen or seized assets.  A large risk in such
47 Mark Seal, Ruth’s World, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 2009, at 216, 229, available at http://
www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/09/ruth-madoff200909-2.
48 See, e.g., Aaron Smith, Madoff: ‘I Knew This Day Would Come’, CNN MONEY (Mar.
12, 2009, 3:33 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/12/news/newsmakers/madoff_courtappear
ance/index.htm?iid=EL (describing Madoff’s crime as “[o]ne of Wall Street’s biggest
swindles”).
49 Complaint at 6, Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 496
B.R. 744 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2013) (No. 08-01789), 2009 WL 2730174, at ¶15.
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., David Segal & Alison Leigh Cowan, Madoffs Shared Much; Question Is
How Much, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at A1 (discussing the possibility that Mrs. Madoff had
knowledge of the crime).
52 See Seal, supra note 47, at 229. R
53 7 ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD
§ 19:5, at 19-23 (2d ed. 2014).
54 Id.; see also Complaint, supra note 49, at 2. R
55 See BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 53, at 19-23. R
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a deal, however, is that it does not protect the spouse from civil claims.56
Although Ruth Madoff’s deal did not protect her from civil claims, in
cases where a spouse’s innocence is uncontested there would likely be no
basis for a civil claim.  The spouse would likely be able to keep the full
sum allotted in the settlement.
Another risk in striking a deal is that the spouse may end up having
to settle for assets worth significantly less than those that were allegedly
untainted, as was the case in Ruth Madoff’s deal.  In deciding whether to
enter into a deal, a spouse will have to weigh the value of a lesser lump-
sum payment against the potential difficulties in waging a legal battle to
show that seized assets were untainted by fraud.
4. Divorce
In cases where an innocent spouse has divorced a fraud defendant,
the spouse may be able to keep assets recovered in the divorce settle-
ment, even if tainted.  In 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals va-
cated a district court’s holding that granted a preliminary injunction
freezing the assets of a fraud defendant’s ex-wife.57
Janet Schaberg and Stephen Walsh separated in 2004 and finalized a
divorce settlement in 2006.58  The settlement required Walsh to pay
Schaberg $12.5 million in biannual installments until 2020; allowed her
to keep $5 million held in checking accounts during their marriage; gave
her an interest in a New York home; and gave her sole ownership of
other real property.59  In exchange, Schaberg waived her right to “any
further equitable distribution, maintenance, or inheritance.”60  The CFTC
and the SEC sued Walsh, and sued Schaberg as a relief defendant, in the
Southern District of New York.61  The suit sought to freeze the majority
of Schaberg’s assets because they were the proceeds of Walsh’s fraud.62
Neither agency alleged that Schaberg was a participant in the fraud or
had any knowledge of it.63  The district court rejected Schaberg’s argu-
56 Mrs. Madoff’s agreement with the government expressly provided that the trustee for
the liquidation of Bernie Madoff’s business would not be precluded from seeking to recover
from Mrs. Madoff.  Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶3.  The trustee did file such a suit, alleging R
that he was entitled to recover the $44 million that Mrs. Madoff received in fraudulent trans-
fers from Bernie Madoff’s business. Id.; accord BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 53, at 19-24 R
(noting that after Mrs. Madoff’s settlement, she was sued to recover funds that she had alleg-
edly improperly received).
57 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Walsh, 658 F.3d 194, 196, 200 (2d Cir.
2011).
58 Id. at 196.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See id. at 197.
62 See id.
63 See id.
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ment that a divorce decree could cleanse tainted funds transferred pursu-
ant to the divorce and granted the freeze.64
On interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit certified two questions
to the New York Court of Appeals.65  The Court of Appeals answered
the first question, whether proceeds of fraud are included in the defini-
tion of marital property, in the affirmative.66  The Court of Appeals an-
swered the second question, whether “a determination that a spouse paid
‘fair consideration’ . . . [is] precluded, as a matter of law, where all or
part of the marital estate consists of the proceeds of fraud,” in the
negative.67
The Second Circuit then vacated the district court’s ruling and re-
manded the case.68  A basis for vacating was that the district court
granted the freeze on the grounds that the divorce decree did not cleanse
the tainted assets.69  Because the Court of Appeals clearly answered the
certified questions contrary to the district court’s reasoning, the freeze
had to be vacated.70  On remand, the district court would have to con-
sider whether Schaberg had given valid consideration for the assets,
which could include giving up her right to maintenance, inheritance,
child custody, or visitation.71  Valid consideration does not include giv-
ing up a claim to a greater sum of tainted assets.72
The Second Circuit stated only that a prior finalized divorce decree
could cleanse the taint from assets.73  It did not, however, address the
question of whether a divorce decree could still cleanse the taint if the
divorce occurs after the investigation has begun or if the freeze is already
in place.  However, this recent ruling would seem to affect only those
spouses who have divorced the defendant and received the tainted assets
before charges are brought against him.  Although a divorce decree
cleansing tainted assets would make it much easier for innocent spouses
to regain their frozen assets, courts would not likely unfreeze such assets.
The obvious reason would be that too many spouses might then abuse the
access that a divorce could grant to their assets, and divorces would be
encouraged as an easy way to regain frozen assets.
Nevertheless, there may be some hope that the ruling could apply to
divorces initiated after investigations have begun or assets have been fro-
64 See id. at 198.
65 See id. at 197.
66 See id.
67 Id. at 198.
68 See id. at 200.
69 See id. at 198.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 196, 198.
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zen, at least in New York, given that the Court of Appeals noted that a
divorce decree may cleanse tainted assets “at least where the innocent
spouse acted in good faith and gave fair consideration.”74  This reasoning
opens the possibility that the ruling would apply in such cases, allowing
the spouse to move on with her life away from the defendant.
II. ANALYSIS
Let us consider an example.  For ease of reference throughout this
part of the Note, we will call our innocent spouse “Anne.”  Anne’s hus-
band is a defendant in a securities fraud case.  It is undisputed in this case
that Anne had no knowledge of her husband’s wrongdoings.  The court
has granted a very broad TRO that freezes all of the defendant’s assets
and is in effect for anyone who holds assets of or shares assets with the
defendant.  Because Anne is the spouse of the defendant, this TRO cov-
ers her assets.  Furthermore, Anne has been named as a nominal defen-
dant in the suit, potentially leaving her personal assets open to
recovery.75  Let us also assume that because Anne has been a home-
maker since marrying the defendant, she has few assets that are entirely
her own.  Anne is now left without assets to cover attorney’s fees or
living expenses to support herself and her two young children.76
A. Difficulties in Accessing Assets to Pay for Attorney’s Fees
Assuming that Anne is entitled to one or more of the aforemen-
tioned remedies, she will need an attorney in order to pursue any of
them.  In reality, however, attorney’s fees can be a crippling cost that
may prevent Anne from pursuing any of these remedies.
In cases where an attorney is not paid in advance, the issue will be
whether frozen assets may be released to pay for attorney’s fees.  When
the court imposes an asset freeze, it is not required to set aside separate
funds to cover attorney’s fees.77  The SEC generally opposes any motion
to release funds to pay attorney’s fees78 and courts often deny such re-
74 Id. at 198.
75 See Simmons supra note 17. R
76 Although the situation may seem exaggerated, it is, in fact, a scenario that does occur
in real life.  See, for example, the case of Maria Gonzalez-Miranda.  Reply Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion by Maria Gonzalez-Miranda for Interim Relief and Modification of
the Temporary Order Freezing Assets, SEC v. Illarramendi, No. 3:11-CV-00078 (JBA), 2011
WL 2457734 (D. Conn. June 16, 2011).  In that case, all of Ms. Gonzalez-Miranda’s assets
were frozen when the SEC charged her husband. See id. at 2.  Ms. Gonzalez was left with no
funds to “feed, clothe, and educate her children and heat the home where she [resided].” Id. at
1 (note that she was seeking to heat her home in November in Connecticut).  Ms. Gonzalez-
Miranda was rendered so destitute that she was awarded state-provided assistance, specifically
“food stamps, HUSKY insurance, and fuel.” Id. at 3.
77 See id.
78 BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 12-221. R
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quests by defendants.79  The reasoning behind this is that the frozen as-
sets may represent funds that belong to those who have been defrauded,
and the defendant has no right to use “other people’s money” to retain
the attorney of his choice.  For example, the Seventh Circuit has stated,
“Just as a bank robber cannot use the loot to wage the best defense
money can buy, so a swindler in securities markets cannot use the vic-
tims’ assets to hire counsel who will help him retain the gleanings of
crime.”80  This may effectively leave spouses such as Anne with no pos-
sibility of paying an attorney to help her to obtain any of these equitable
remedies.
Although the argument against using “other people’s money” in a
securities fraud case is appealing, upon further analysis, the logic is cir-
cular.  Assuming that some of the frozen assets are untainted, a defendant
would require an attorney to make a showing that the assets are un-
tainted.  Yet such a showing could not be made without having funds
released to pay for an attorney in the first place.
SEC v. Dowdell81 provides an example of a court’s recognition of
the unfairness in denying a defendant’s motion to release assets to cover
attorney’s fees.  The Dowdell court noted that the case law in this area is
“anything but consistent on whether defendants in this type of civil en-
forcement action may be permitted to pay attorney’s fees with a portion
of their frozen assets.”82  In referencing the different views taken by
courts, the court made note of the strict approach taken by the Seventh
Circuit: “On one end of the spectrum is the Seventh Circuit which has
not minced words in expressing its opposition to such requests.”83  The
Dowdell court, however, took a different approach than that of the Sev-
enth Circuit:
This court’s central concern is the fairness of the pro-
ceedings.  The court does not believe that it could
achieve a fair result at the preliminary injunction hearing
were it to deny defendants the ability to retain counsel.
This is a complex legal matter, and lawyers are essential
to the presentation of issues related to it.84
The court then held that it would approve a “reasonable” estimate of
attorney’s fees necessary for the hearing on the SEC’s motion for a pre-
liminary injunction.85
79 Id.
80 SEC v. Quinn, 997 F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1993).
81 175 F. Supp. 2d 850 (W.D. Va. 2001).
82 Id. at 855.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 856.
85 Id.
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In United States v. E-Gold, Ltd.,86 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals also seemed to be in favor of releasing assets to cover the cost of
attorney’s fees for a post-seizure hearing.  Although the seizure of assets
was not in the context of securities fraud,87 the analysis of whether to
release funds to pay attorney’s fees would apply regardless of why the
assets were frozen by the government.  The D.C. Circuit recognized that
although there may be an immediate need to issue an injunction to pre-
vent the defendant from hiding the assets, this need must be balanced
against the right to counsel of choice.88  The D.C. Circuit applied the test
set out by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge to determine the
due process rights of a defendant whose property has been seized, weigh-
ing three interests:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the offi-
cial action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional or substitute pro-
cedural requirement would entail.89
The D.C. Circuit noted that, under the first prong of the Mathews test, the
defendant’s private interest is not merely in using his property as he sees
fit but is “augmented by an important liberty interest: the qualified right,
under the sixth amendment, to counsel of choice.”90  The qualified right
to counsel of choice is established where “the defendants are not finan-
cially capable of retaining counsel of choice without the seized prop-
erty.”91  The D.C. Circuit further echoed that “[t]he defendant needs the
attorney now if the attorney is to do him any good.”92
As evidenced by the foregoing discussion, there is no one standard
that compels a court to act in any particular way regarding the unfreezing
of assets for attorney’s fees.  The differing views, however, make it clear
86 521 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
87 In E-Gold, the government obtained an ex parte seizure warrant to seize for forfeiture
the funds in the defendant companies’ accounts, after indicting the defendants for operating an
unlicensed money transmitting business. Id. at 412–13.
88 See id. at 415–16.
89 Id. at 416 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
90 Id. at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The D.C. Circuit chose to follow the
Second Circuit in recognizing the right to counsel of choice where assets have been seized. Id.
at 416 (noting that the Second Circuit’s precedent was “instructive”).  As noted above, the
Sixth Amendment is only implicated where the SEC brings a companion criminal case, and
therefore does not apply in all situations that might arise in this Note. See supra note 42. R
91 Id. at 417.
92 Id. at 418 (quoting United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 726 (7th Cir. 1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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that it is entirely possible to release reasonable funds from an assets
freeze to cover attorney’s fees.  Given the compelling circumstances of
nominal defendants such as Anne, courts should be more lenient in re-
leasing assets.  Courts should follow the rationales set forward in cases
such as Dowdell, which advocate for consideration of the unfairness of
denying defendants the assets necessary to cover reasonable attorney’s
fees.
B. Procedural Due Process Considerations
A broad TRO freezing all of the assets of a spouse such as Anne
might lead to the question of whether such a seizure amounts to a due
process violation.93  There are some indicia of a violation, such as the ex
parte nature of the hearing.  The answer, however, seems to be that there
is no such violation.  Given that the TRO will be lifted should the ac-
cused be found not guilty, the TRO is technically only a temporary depri-
vation of property.94  Regardless, the temporary deprivation is still
“subject to the constraints of due process.”95  Normally, due process re-
quires that, before a deprivation of property can occur, there is “notice
and an opportunity to be heard.”96  In some “extraordinary situations,”
however, notice and a hearing may be postponed until after the depriva-
tion occurs.97  These “extraordinary situations” are governed by the
three-prong test in Mathews.98
Under the Mathews test, freezing assets would not require a pre-
deprivation hearing to comport with the requirements of due process.
The interests of the SEC meet the extraordinary situation exception, be-
cause the freeze will serve recognized government interests including,
“(1) ‘separating a criminal from his ill-gotten gains,’ (2) obtaining sub-
stantial funds for furtherance of law enforcement, [and] (3) permitting
recovery of assets by their ‘rightful owners.’”99  These government inter-
ests outweigh the defendant’s private interests and the risk of erroneous
deprivation.100  Unfortunately, Anne is not entitled to a hearing before
her assets are frozen; the granting of the TRO will remain an ex parte
proceeding.101
93 The due process violation would be the deprivation of property without the due pro-
cess of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
94 See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991).
95 Id.
96 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98 See discussion supra Part II.A.
99 Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1192 (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989)).
100 See id.
101 But see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (“[W]hen welfare is discontin-
ued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due
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C. The Inefficiency and Unfairness in Granting Broad TROs
It is necessary to consider the rationale behind ordering broad TROs
that prevent spouses from accessing joint assets that may be necessary
for them to live off of.  There is an interest in assuring that victims of the
fraud are compensated.  If, however, there were to be a later showing that
some assets were untainted, in many cases those assets would be released
and would not be used towards the payment of any penalties.  Therefore,
it seems excessive to freeze such assets from the start of the case.
There is a strong argument that society does not benefit when un-
tainted funds are frozen.  In extreme cases, spouses might be rendered so
helpless that they qualify for help from the state.102  Thus taxpayers sup-
port individuals who would otherwise be able to support themselves, if it
were not for their funds being frozen due to a broad TRO.
An alternative option, the one advocated for by this Note, is to re-
quire a showing that the assets to be frozen are tainted at the ex parte
hearing—before the TRO is granted.  Although the SEC must have
power to ensure a recovery, a freeze on an innocent spouse’s untainted
assets is surely an overreach.  Because in most cases the defendant has
not been perpetrating the fraud for his entire career, there are very likely
untainted assets that are being frozen.  The court should be required to
make a preliminary inquiry into—and the SEC should be required to
present evidence of—what assets are untainted and to leave those assets
out of the TRO.  While it may be simple for the court to freeze one
hundred percent of a defendant’s assets, it would not be overly inefficient
to require the court to make an inquiry into what assets are untainted
before granting the order.  Such an inquiry would prevent spouses like
Anne from being deprived of all joint assets in cases where some assets
are untainted.
Furthermore, defendants are likely to raise the issue of untainted
assets when seeking to modify the order.103  Therefore, not only would
the requirement serve the interest of fairness, it would also serve the
interest of efficiency.  First, the SEC will have already determined which
assets are tainted.  Second, if untainted assets are left out of the freeze
initially, defendants may have enough funds to cover attorney’s fees and
living expenses and may not seek to modify the TRO.  This solution
would be particularly just for spouses like Anne, who have only a finan-
cial interest in the case (as opposed to the liberty interests of a culpable
defendant who could potentially be facing imprisonment).  This solution
process.”).  There may be an argument that the seizing of funds necessary to pay for housing,
food, and childcare may constitute the type of deprivation that was found to require a pre-
termination hearing in Goldberg. Id. at 262.
102 See supra note 76. R
103 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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is fair because it would not cause innocent spouses like Anne to be de-
prived of the funds they need for trial and would still freeze tainted funds
that rightfully belong to the defrauded investors.
Another option that would lead to less unfairness in granting the
TRO would be for the court to include a consideration of the hardships
that would be placed on innocent spouses when granting the TRO.  It is
unrealistic to disregard dependents who will be impacted.  In some cases,
spouses may be deprived of their homes and funds to pay for their most
basic living expenses.  This is even more relevant in cases, such as that
of Anne, where the defendant has young children.
The SEC’s burden for obtaining an asset freeze is very low when
compared to standards for an injunction in other types of cases, including
other kinds of SEC cases.104  For a TRO to be granted, the SEC need
only show that it is “likely to succeed on the merits.”105  The SEC need
not make a showing of irreparable harm.106  In civil litigation between
private litigants much weight is given to a balancing of the hardships.
For example, the Fourth Circuit uses a standard that requires balancing
“the ‘likelihood’ of irreparable harm to the plaintiff against the ‘likeli-
hood’ of harm to the defendant.”107  Only when there is no clear differ-
ence in the hardships should the court look to the merits of the case, and
in such cases relief is “more likely to require a clear showing of a likeli-
hood of success.”108
Granted, the nature of securities fraud cases may not make them
conducive to only a balance of the hardships test for a preliminary in-
junction.  The interests of the defrauded investors may require a lower
standard for granting the TRO to protect against a defendant hiding a
large amount of tainted assets.  There is room, however, for some consid-
eration of the hardships, especially when freezing the assets of innocent
spouses like Anne.  Furthermore, a balance of the hardships would be
very pertinent for spouses whose personal assets have been frozen, even
though they are innocent.
D. Innocent Spouse Relief in the Context of Tax Fraud
The law has recognized exceptions for innocent spouses for another
type of fraud—tax fraud.  Spouses often file joint tax returns because it
allows them to take advantage of benefits that may not be available to
104 See supra note 14. R
105 SEC v. Hede´n, 51 F. Supp. 2d 296, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting SEC v. Cavanagh,
155 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106 See id.
107 Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 808 (4th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 1977)).
108 Id.
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those filing individually.109  The downside to this is that both spouses
may be held jointly and severally liable for the entire tax liability.110
This is true even if only one spouse earns all of the household income or
if the spouses later divorce.111  The Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
however, will relieve spouses from paying tax, interest, or penalties if
they meet certain criteria.112  One type of relief is aptly named “Innocent
Spouse Relief.”113
Four conditions are necessary to make an individual eligible for In-
nocent Spouse Relief.114  First, the spouses must have filed a joint re-
turn.115  Second, the return must have an understated tax due to the non-
claimant spouse’s errors.116  Third, the spouse claiming relief must show
that at the time the return was filed, she had no actual knowledge of, and
no reason to know of, the understated tax.117  And finally, unfairness
would have to result if, “[t]aking into account all the facts and circum-
stances,” the claimant spouse were to be held liable for the understated
tax.118
Furthermore, the IRS has made it even simpler for innocent spouses
to escape liability in tax fraud cases by allowing two additional catego-
ries of relief for those spouses who do not meet the standard for Innocent
Spouse Relief.  Under “Separation of Liability Relief,” the IRS will only
require the innocent spouse to pay for the portion of taxes she is liable
109 See, e.g., Dan Caplinger, Married Filing Separately: When Does It Make Sense?,
DAILY FINANCE (Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2014/03/29/taxes-married-fil
ing-separately/ (noting that for the “vast majority” filing joint tax returns saves money).
110 I.R.S. Publication 971 (July 17, 2012), at 1, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p971.pdf.
111 Jason Alderman, “Innocent Spouse Relief” Protects Against Tax Fraud, HUFFINGTON
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-alderman/innocent-spouse-relief_b_1631665.html
(last updated Aug. 28, 2012).
112 I.R.S., supra note 110, at 2. R
113 Id.
114 I.R.C. § 6015(b) (2012) (a timeliness requirement also applies).
115 § 6015(b)(1)(A) (2012).
116 § 6015(b)(1)(B), (C) (2012); see also I.R.S., supra note 110, at 5 (stating that an un- R
derstated tax may take the form of either unreported income or an incorrect deduction, credit,
or basis).
117 § 6015(b)(1)(C) (2012); see also Erdahl v. Comm’r, 930 F.2d 585, 590 (8th Cir. 1991)
(“The standard we adopt for innocent spouse cases asks ‘whether a reasonably prudent tax-
payer under the circumstances of the spouse at the time of signing the return could be expected
to know that the tax liability stated was erroneous or that further investigation was war-
ranted.’” (quoting Stevens v. Comm’r, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989))).  Whether a
spouse had reason to know of an understated tax is based on the facts and circumstances of the
situation.  Considerations may include the claimant’s financial situation, her educational back-
ground, any failure to inquire, and departures from a recurring pattern, among other things.
I.R.S., supra note 110, at 6. R
118 § 6015(b)(1)(D) (2012).  Facts and circumstances to be taken into consideration in-
clude whether the claimant spouse received a benefit from the understated tax and whether the
non-claimant spouse has left or divorced the claimant spouse.  I.R.S., supra note 110, at 6. R
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for (rather than holding the spouses jointly and severally liable).119  The
IRS may also grant “Equitable Relief” to innocent spouses who do not
qualify for either Innocent Spouse Relief or Separation of Liability
Relief.120
The fact that the law has recognized an exception for innocent
spouses in tax fraud cases suggests that the same could be possible in
securities fraud cases.  In both situations, an innocent spouse faces liabil-
ity for the fraudulent actions of her spouse.  Furthermore, in both situa-
tions the innocent spouse would be liable to a third party—to defrauded
investors and to the government.  Requiring courts to consider undue
hardships caused to innocent spouses in fraud cases seems analogous to
the “out” given to innocent spouses based on the unfairness that would
result if they were held liable for an understated tax.  Given the feasibil-
ity of granting Innocent Spouse Relief in federal tax fraud cases, a hard-
ship inquiry prior to granting a freeze of assets in a securities fraud case
is certainly possible.
Innocent Spouse Relief in the tax fraud context also suggests an-
other pathway to protecting the innocent spouse in securities fraud cases:
legislation.  While this Note argues mainly for change through the judi-
cial process, protection through legislation is also a viable option.  Be-
cause legislators felt it was necessary to codify innocent spouse
protections in IRS law, legislators may also be open to protecting inno-
cent spouses through changes to SEC statutes.  Legislators could put in
place a clearly defined burden of proof for the innocent spouse, akin to
the IRS’s innocent spouse relief.  Such a rule would make it easier for
innocent spouses to understand what is required to prove their innocence
and would solve the procedural and financial burdens surrounding the
release of untainted assets.
CONCLUSION
The increased occurrence of securities fraud enforcement necessi-
tates a reevaluation of how such cases affect innocent spouses.  In fact,
such cases may have a large effect on not only the innocent victims of
the fraud, but also the innocent spouses and children of culpable defend-
ants.  In some cases, spouses may have their assets frozen even when
they have not been accused of any wrongdoing and where such assets are
personal and not traceable to the fraud.
119 I.R.S., supra note 110, at 7. R
120 Id. at 8; see also Alderman, supra note 111 (discussing the leeway granted under R
Equitable Relief, including the IRS’s elimination of the two year filing requirement, which
aids innocent spouses who were unaware of the fraud, or were afraid to come forward for
reasons such as domestic abuse).
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Innocent spouses may have equitable remedies available to them—
requesting a modification of the TRO or showing that frozen assets are
untainted by the fraud.  But these remedies may not be enough.  Courts
are often unwilling to modify a TRO, even in cases where the defendant
has made a showing that the assets are untainted by the fraud.  Innocent
spouses may also be able to enter into a deal with the government to
retain some assets; however, the amount of assets retained may be very
limited.  Such a deal also may not protect the spouse from civil claims.
Moreover, even if spouses like Anne divorce the defendant, they will
likely be unable to retain any assets granted in the divorce decree if they
are deemed to be tainted by fraud.
Furthermore, to pursue any of the equitable remedies that spouses
such as Anne may have available requires that the spouse have funds to
cover attorney’s fees.  For many this may prove very difficult, even im-
possible.  Thus, a spouse may be effectively prevented from pursuing
any remedies.  Although some courts have realized that this is inherently
unfair, other courts continue to refuse to allow assets to be released from
a freeze.  While denial of a motion to release assets may be fair where
the assets are tainted, maintaining a freeze on the untainted assets of an
innocent spouse is an overreach that should be remedied.
The solution suggested in this Note is to narrow the scope of the
TRO granted to the SEC when they bring an action.  This Note recog-
nizes that there is a strong interest in maintaining an ex parte proceeding
so that the defendant will not find a way to hide any assets before they
are served with the order.  However, the proceeding could still require
that the SEC make a showing that the assets are tainted by the fraud.
Currently, the SEC would have to make such a showing in a later prelim-
inary hearing upon the defendant’s request; therefore, this simply moves
up the timing.
Such a solution is in the interests of both fairness and efficiency.
The solution is fair because it allows an innocent spouse to make a show-
ing that the assets frozen are untainted without preventing the spouse
from using those very assets to pay an attorney.  Furthermore, this solu-
tion would be in the interest of efficiency because it could reduce the
need for a later hearing to show that the assets are untainted.
The court could also raise the standards for granting a TRO.  Cur-
rently, the standard is very low in comparison with injunctions in other
contexts.  Raising the standard to include a balancing of the hardships
that would occur if the TRO is granted would help to remedy some of the
unfairness experienced by spouses such as Anne.
Clearly, it is possible to maintain an effective system of freezing
funds that have been obtained illegally without punishing those who are
innocent.  This is evidenced by the fact that the government has found a
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way to do so in other situations, namely in cases of tax fraud. Innocent
spouses are granted multiple forms of relief if, unbeknownst to them,
their spouse commits tax fraud.  Surely, if such broad exemptions have
been made in the context of tax fraud, concessions can also be made to
protect innocent spouses in securities fraud cases.
In conclusion, there are multiple ways that the court could protect
the interests of innocent spouses in securities fraud cases.  Furthermore,
the ex parte nature of the proceedings could be maintained, thereby
guarding against the possibility of the defendant hiding assets, while of-
fering more fairness in the scope of the assets frozen—granting reasona-
ble attorney’s fees.  Most importantly, these potential solutions offer a
way to make SEC actions fairer and more efficient without forfeiting the
key goals of the SEC.
